This research asks how authoritarian rulers choose which local elites to co-opt with rents. The core argument is that elites who occupy central positions in their locality’s family network exert greater social influence over community members and are therefore more likely to be targeted with distributive benefits as a tool of social control.
This study investigates why some counties receive central government infrastructure investments while others do not, focusing on the role of retired communist revolutionaries in China.
This study asks whether demand for clientelism among informal workers can be attenuated, and whether reducing that demand translates into support for programmatic alternatives. The authors ran an information experiment with firm owners ahead of Senegal’s 2022 local elections, at a moment when an upstart faction campaigned on programmatic reform. They report that reminding informal workers of their ability to coordinate reduced engagement with dominant clientelistic networks, but that shift generally led to political disengagement rather than mobilization for programmatic candidates.
Conventional wisdom holds that vote buying erodes trust in elections, but systematic evidence is scarce. Three expectations were evaluated: a general negative relationship between vote buying and electoral trust; reduced effects among citizens who view vote buying positively; and reduced effects in contexts already marred by electoral irregularities.
This article investigates how American patronage initiatives interact with recipient states' capacity to manage resources, influencing the onset and intensity of civil conflicts.
This article challenges the common view of state job distribution by revealing how it serves primarily as a tool for political financing.
Traditional models of clientelism assume little choice for poor voters, but India's urban slums show broker competition.
Vote brokers are crucial intermediaries for politicians seeking to mobilize voters through clientelist appeals, yet the effectiveness of different broker types remains unclear.
In electorally contested regimes, incumbent parties often rely on clientelism to maintain power. This article examines how the role of clientelism evolves with a party's increasing tenure. Analyzing data from Afrobarometer and partisan turnover records reveals that longer party duration enhances clientelism's effectiveness in bolstering support through club goods and patronage. This occurs because extended rule facilitates bureaucratic politicization, essential for sustained clientelist exchanges. The findings offer insights into dominant-party dynamics under electoral contestation.
Lijphart's consensus–majoritarian typology is widely used but has rarely been applied to Latin America. This study adapts that framework for the region by treating the type of democracy as an independent variable and adding informal factors—such as clientelism and informal employment—into the assessment of democratic patterns.
African swing voters are often considered difficult to persuade, yet existing approaches have limitations.
Existing studies suggest voters are swayed by local patrons through coercion or personal ties, not political competence.
How do legislative primaries affect electoral performance? This question is examined through a novel lens in the context of Ghana's new democracy. Existing theories suggest primaries may hurt parties by selecting extremists or help them choose high-valence candidates, but these mechanisms are challenged where clientelism is prominent.