civil society

This paper asks how foreign donors respond when recipient governments pass restrictive laws targeting NGOs: do donors push back by increasing democracy support or back down by cutting it? Using dyadic aid-flow data, an original cross-national data set of NGO laws, and multiple research designs, the authors examine whether and how donors change democracy-promotion funding after such laws are enacted. Their central contribution is empirical evidence on donor behavior in the aftermath of restrictive NGO legislation and its potential incentives for governments considering curbs on civil society.

This paper asks how well states implement recommendations from temporary national truth commissions, focusing on 11 Latin American cases and using existing coded data to measure compliance. It contributes by applying a multilevel ordered logistic model to recommendation-level implementation data and assessing which recommendation types and contextual factors are associated with higher or lower compliance.

Since 1970, scores of states have created truth commissions to document political violence, yet why some countries adopt them — and why some commissions gain strong investigative powers while others do not — remains unclear.