Democratic Accountability

This paper asks whether features of party organization help explain Italy’s mixed performance on multiple dimensions of democratic quality, and how Italy compares to other liberal democracies over time. Focusing on two party organizational features—personalization and institutionalization—the authors first map Italy’s ups and downs across democratic dimensions relative to other liberal democracies. They then use regression analysis to test how variation in party personalization and institutionalization relates to measures of democratic quality.

Gun violence is a large and growing problem in the United States. Many reformers look towards elections to spur policy change in this area. In this paper, we explore the effects of school shootings on electoral mobilization and election outcomes. We pair data from several sources that measure validated voter registration; validated voter turnout; and the electoral performance of officials at the local, state, and federal levels with regression discontinuity and panel methods. Our effects show that shootings have little to no effect on electoral outcomes in the United States. Our work demonstrates that even when tragic events occur that are squarely in the realm of elected officials†responsibility, have high levels of issue salience, are highly-covered by the media, draw citizens†attention, and (perhaps) shift public opinion, these seemingly favorable conditions may not be enough to elicit democratic accountability.

This study investigates how government politicians strategically communicate about economic conditions and crime to voters.

In Italy during two corruption crises, this study examines renomination patterns for legislators.

The author investigates whether rising economic inequality, reminiscent of the Gilded Age, undermines democratic accountability.

Scholarship often focuses on democratic responsiveness by examining whether political outcomes reflect public opinion. However, we argue that scholars have overlooked attitudes toward how power is used to achieve those policies.

Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies simultaneously rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations that argues these events fundamentally differ from piecemeal reforms in their political dynamics.

This article presents a novel explanation for democratic elections—candidates incur psychological costs from deception. Using lab experiments, the study demonstrates that campaign promises significantly influence both voter preferences and representative conduct.