Article summary
This article introduces a new maximum likelihood estimator for analyzing durations in continuous time war of attrition games, where players compete over a prize with incomplete information about each other's strength.
This article introduces a new maximum likelihood estimator for analyzing durations in continuous time war of attrition games, where players compete over a prize with incomplete information about each other's strength.
This article explores whether selfish voting preferences can be overcome by majority rule. It examines the tension between individual self-interest and collective decision-making in democratic systems.
This article explores a surprising finding: even a climate club initiated by just a few countries can effectively reduce global emissions over time.
This article examines transparency's role in supporting democratic institutions. It provides a game-theoretic model demonstrating that transparent systems improve electoral outcomes by mitigating adverse selection problems between citizens and their rulers.
Economic crises can spark both protectionist and liberalizing trade policies.
This study adapts Roger Myerson's game-theoretic model to examine democratic incentives through experimental design. The research tests four key predictions regarding leadership behavior:
This study reveals that fragmented antigovernment networks increase conflictual behavior.