Senegal

This study asks whether demand for clientelism among informal workers can be attenuated, and whether reducing that demand translates into support for programmatic alternatives. The authors ran an information experiment with firm owners ahead of Senegal’s 2022 local elections, at a moment when an upstart faction campaigned on programmatic reform. They report that reminding informal workers of their ability to coordinate reduced engagement with dominant clientelistic networks, but that shift generally led to political disengagement rather than mobilization for programmatic candidates.

The rule of law is crucial for economic activity, but political interference introduces complexities. This study investigates how state selective enforcement affects market trust and fairness. Key Insight: Political connections create moral hazard by biasing expectations regarding legal protection. We designed an innovative field experiment within the Senegal business context to understand these dynamics. Our design randomly assigned treatments involving employee signaling of political connections and offering formal contracts during transactions.