Civil service reform in US states is significantly driven by divided government situations. This research demonstrates that reforms often occur when state legislative chambers are split, rather than solely during executive-legislative divides.
This study asks whether executives exploit gaps between legislative sessions to pursue policy by unilateral action, and when legislatures can block that tactic. Using variation across US states in intersession timing, divided versus unified government, and whether legislatures control special session timing, the authors identify conditions under which governors increase executive orders during adjournments. The central contribution is evidence—drawn from state-level analysis—that intersession breaks create opportunities for executive unilateralism, but only when legislatures lack the power to call or control special sessions.
Understanding the disconnect between political preferences and voting behavior has long been a puzzle in American politics.
Political elites are known to constrain democracies’ use of overt military force, but the literature has largely ignored whether those same elite dynamics curb the initiation of covert operations. Secrecy is often assumed to let leaders sidestep congressional oversight. The central question is whether elite opposition—especially from Congress—limits presidents’ ability to act secretly or whether it affects only overt force.
This study investigates why Congress fragments implementation power by policy area. We argue that divided party government motivates fragmentation as a strategy to enhance legislative control over bureaucracy.
Does the partisan makeup of state governments shape where foreign multinationals locate? The article argues yes: partisan differences in state economic-development strategies persist, and foreign firms value elements of both parties' approaches. Republicans tend to favor an investment-driven (supply-side) growth model, while Democrats favor a consumption-driven (demand-side) model. Because each approach offers distinct benefits to multinational firms, a blend of policies—most likely produced under split (divided) state government—makes those states especially attractive.