In electorally contested regimes, incumbent parties often rely on clientelism to maintain power. This article examines how the role of clientelism evolves with a party's increasing tenure. Analyzing data from Afrobarometer and partisan turnover records reveals that longer party duration enhances clientelism's effectiveness in bolstering support through club goods and patronage. This occurs because extended rule facilitates bureaucratic politicization, essential for sustained clientelist exchanges. The findings offer insights into dominant-party dynamics under electoral contestation.

Key Question: How does clientelism adapt in long-ruling parties?

Using Afrobarometer data alongside partisan turnover records, we assess the changing role of clientelism over a party's tenure. We find that longer incumbency strengthens the connection between state resources and clientelist practices like distributing club goods or patronage.

What This Means: Clientelism becomes more institutionalized as parties remain in power. Extended rule allows for deeper bureaucratic integration, making resource distribution more politicized but also more entrenched. This bolsters popular support even when electoral appeal wanes.