This study asks whether demand for clientelism among informal workers can be attenuated, and whether reducing that demand translates into support for programmatic alternatives. The authors ran an information experiment with firm owners ahead of Senegal’s 2022 local elections, at a moment when an upstart faction campaigned on programmatic reform. They report that reminding informal workers of their ability to coordinate reduced engagement with dominant clientelistic networks, but that shift generally led to political disengagement rather than mobilization for programmatic candidates.
Randomized information experiment, Informal workers and firm owners, Reduction in clientelist engagement, Political disengagement rather than programmatic support
Data and methods
The authors implement an information (randomized) experiment targeting firm owners in the run-up to Senegal’s 2022 local elections. The intervention reminded informal workers about their capacity to coordinate and was deployed while a new political faction was campaigning on programmatic reform. The abstract describes this as an information experiment with firm owners; no further sampling frame, measurement details, or statistical specifications are reported in the supplied abstract.
Main findings
According to the abstract, the information treatment reduced informal workers’ engagement with dominant clientelistic networks. That behavioral shift did not, however, translate into increased support for programmatic alternatives; instead, the authors observe greater political disengagement as the primary outcome following the intervention. The summary emphasizes the qualified conclusion that demand for clientelism can be mitigated but that programmatic mobilization remains difficult.
- Reduced engagement with clientelistic networks after the coordination reminder.
- The effect materialized as political disengagement rather than movement toward programmatic candidates.
