This paper asks whether aid fragmentation—the simultaneous operation of multiple development agencies in one setting—affects opportunities for corruption, and it provides the first microlevel empirical look at that question. Using project-level delivery data from Afghanistan, the authors examine how the number and coordination of donors relate to misappropriation and waste, and test a mechanism connecting the types of projects delivered to leakage.
This article asks how the United States applies economic statecraft—positive "carrots" versus negative "sticks"—in response to Latin American countries’ engagement with China and offers a conditional mechanism for when each mode is more likely. The authors argue that U.S. policy in the region tends to emphasize economic engagement instead of coercion, especially with countries that are politically and economically aligned with Washington. They test this claim using a mixed-methods design that combines a focused case study of U.S.–Panama ties with a statistical analysis of how engagement with China relates to U.S. foreign assistance allocations in Latin America.
In the early 21st-century contest for influence in Africa, this study asks whether foreign aid translates into soft power: do Chinese and U.S. aid flows generate public affinity for donors and their values?
This paper asks whether and how Chinese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) site their international development projects in ways that mirror state-led initiatives. Using a unique panel dataset, the authors present the first empirical investigation of location choices by NGOs from an authoritarian state and evaluate whether NGOs follow government-financed projects and political ties when choosing where to operate. The study’s contribution is a descriptive, time-sensitive account of alignment between Chinese government projects and Chinese NGO activity rather than a causal claim beyond the evidence reported.
Many states pair immigration-control measures with development assistance intended to address the "root causes" of migration. A representative type of such "root causes" aid (RCA) project implemented by the UN's International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Africa was evaluated using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to assess whether development assistance can reduce the desire to migrate.
This paper asks how great powers compete for influence by comparing the goods they offer: the United States, it argues, sustains hierarchical patronage with multiple forms of inducement, while China challenges those relationships primarily through development finance. The authors reframe donor competition to consider whether recipients face costs when switching allegiances—costs that reduce the appeal of Beijing’s financing—and test whether existing American hierarchies make recipients less likely to receive Chinese funds.
This paper asks how to measure bilateral (dyadic) trade dependence in a contemporary world economy characterized by intensive intermediate goods trade and changing availability of partners and substitutes. The authors construct measures from structural-gravity models that quantify (1) how much trade interruptions reduce a country’s welfare and (2) how much additional trade from existing partners would be required to compensate. The brief summarizes the research question, the measurement approach, and the paper’s reported comparisons with traditional aggregate measures.
This paper asks how foreign donors respond when recipient governments pass restrictive laws targeting NGOs: do donors push back by increasing democracy support or back down by cutting it? Using dyadic aid-flow data, an original cross-national data set of NGO laws, and multiple research designs, the authors examine whether and how donors change democracy-promotion funding after such laws are enacted. Their central contribution is empirical evidence on donor behavior in the aftermath of restrictive NGO legislation and its potential incentives for governments considering curbs on civil society.
Aid distribution among Syrian refugees in Lebanon surprisingly reduces anti-refugee violence.
How do people view foreign aid to 'nasty' regimes? A survey experiment shows public aversion, but it can be reversed if donors engage closely with such countries. This finding challenges the idea that moral motives are the primary drivers of foreign aid preferences.
How do perceived motives of foreign donors shape attitudes toward aid in an active conflict zone? The focus is the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and two competing ways of framing donor intent: as alleviating suffering (humanitarian) or as expanding donor power and influence (political influence).
This paper examines how foreign aid allocation, tied to human rights and democracy promotion, is influenced by the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Using a natural experiment involving former colonizers holding key positions during budget discussions, it demonstrates that aid increases significantly when this occurs.