NGOs

This paper asks whether and how Chinese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) site their international development projects in ways that mirror state-led initiatives. Using a unique panel dataset, the authors present the first empirical investigation of location choices by NGOs from an authoritarian state and evaluate whether NGOs follow government-financed projects and political ties when choosing where to operate. The study’s contribution is a descriptive, time-sensitive account of alignment between Chinese government projects and Chinese NGO activity rather than a causal claim beyond the evidence reported.

This paper asks how foreign donors respond when recipient governments pass restrictive laws targeting NGOs: do donors push back by increasing democracy support or back down by cutting it? Using dyadic aid-flow data, an original cross-national data set of NGO laws, and multiple research designs, the authors examine whether and how donors change democracy-promotion funding after such laws are enacted. Their central contribution is empirical evidence on donor behavior in the aftermath of restrictive NGO legislation and its potential incentives for governments considering curbs on civil society.

Restrictive laws targeting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have proliferated globally. The central claim is that governments learn to restrict NGOs primarily by copying regional legislative examples, not by reacting to NGO growth or to domestic nonarmed bottom-up threats.

NGOs sometimes sway policy decisions within international organizations (IOs), but the reasons remain unclear. This article explores two aspects.