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Corruption Doesn't Deter Renominations—Except When Voters Notice

Corruption PerceptionItaly ElectionsLegislative RenominationDemocratic AccountabilityEuropean PoliticsLSQ2 R files2 datasetsDataverse
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In Italy during two corruption crises, this study examines renomination patterns for legislators.

Data & Methods: We compared current renomination decisions with those from the previous legislature when corruption was not salient. Using press mentions as a proxy for public knowledge of corruption, we tracked how many times each incumbent was linked to corruption in media coverage.

Key Findings: Renominations decreased significantly when incumbents were associated with corruption only if this connection became politically salient enough to matter.

Why It Matters? This suggests party leaders are the primary enforcers of democratic accountability, stepping in where voters' attention is divided. They can maintain party reputation and push out malfeasant legislators during periods when issues like corruption gain public prominence.

Article card for article: Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy
Corruption, Party Leaders, and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy was authored by Raffaele Asquer, Miriam A. Golden and Brian T. Hamel. It was published by Wiley in LSQ in 2020.
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Legislative Studies Quarterly
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