This article explores whether selfish voting preferences can be overcome by majority rule. It examines the tension between individual self-interest and collective decision-making in democratic systems.
Data & Methods: Analyzing voter surveys from multiple countries including the US, Germany, and Brazil provides insights into voting behavior patterns.
Key Findings: Results indicate that cooperative impulses often exist but may be swayed by strategic considerations. Individuals frequently balance personal gain with social expectations.
Why It Matters: The implications challenge assumptions about rational choice theory in political settings. These findings suggest potential pathways for policy interventions aimed at enhancing collective welfare through voting.
| Selfish and Cooperative Voting: Can the Majority Restrain Themselves? was authored by Peter DeScioli, Bowen Cho, Scott E. Bokemper and Andrew W. Delton. It was published by Springer in Pol. Behav. in 2020. |
