US Presidency

Presidential executive orders often shape policy, but their endurance is poorly understood. This study examines why some survive while others are quickly reversed. Using survival analysis on all revoked orders from 1937-2013, the research develops a theory of longevity based on order characteristics and changing political climates. Key findings reveal that factors like veto threat strength significantly predict an order's lifespan. Why it matters? The results provide crucial insights into presidential power dynamics and legal instrument durability in volatile political environments. This understanding helps explain policy persistence across administrations.

Many observers decry an "imperial presidency" in war-making, equating unilateral force with an unconstrained executive. This research reframes the war powers debate by centering the powerful incentives lawmakers have to avoid blame for military action.

This article asks whether U.S. leaders time arms transfers to autocratic states for electoral advantage during presidential election years. Using several empirical tests, the author documents an electoral cycle in arms deals with autocracies, connects those deals to increases in defense contract awards in swing U.S. states, and investigates process mechanisms. The analysis examines how timing shifts after regime change, the role of U.S. allies in driving the autocratic arms-deal cycle, and the correspondence between platforms sold in arms deals and platforms that generate swing-state defense contracts. The author frames these findings as evidence that an electoral motivation helps explain patterns of U.S. security cooperation with autocratic partners, while preserving the observational limits of the study.

Many observers argue that Congress has weakened capacity to govern, and understanding that decline requires attention to how member offices build—or fail to build—expertise.

This article asks how domestic factors affect US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions and whether they choose different exit routes (for example, capitulation) depending on political pressure. Using a novel dataset of US sanctions from 1990–2018 combined with interviews and anecdotal practitioner evidence, the author links presidents’ political standing and congressional oversight to variation in the timing and manner of sanctions termination.

Presidential misinformation about climate change raises concerns, especially during campaigns.

Does high public approval correlate with increased presidential unilateral action? This research examines whether political sentiment constrains or encourages executive orders. Conventional wisdom suggests that presidents rely on unilateral power when unpopular; we find the opposite is true.

Scholars have explored the executive appointment process but often overlooked key connections. This study examines how nominee ideology and agency decision-maker independence influence presidential choices and Senate confirmations. We analyze theoretical hypotheses about these factors' effects.