This study asks whether executives exploit gaps between legislative sessions to pursue policy by unilateral action, and when legislatures can block that tactic. Using variation across US states in intersession timing, divided versus unified government, and whether legislatures control special session timing, the authors identify conditions under which governors increase executive orders during adjournments. The central contribution is evidence—drawn from state-level analysis—that intersession breaks create opportunities for executive unilateralism, but only when legislatures lack the power to call or control special sessions.
Key measurement: executive orders during intersession breaks Key moderator: special session powers of legislatures Focus: variation across US states
Data and methods
The authors analyze state-level executive activity in the United States, comparing periods during intersession breaks to regular sessions. They leverage institutional variation—whether a legislature can control special sessions—and differences in partisan control (divided versus unified government) to assess how these factors relate to the timing of executive orders. The abstract frames this as a comparative test across US states rather than a single-case study.
Main findings
The paper reports that executives issue more executive orders during intersession breaks under divided government compared with unified government, but this pattern appears only in states where legislatures lack control over special sessions. Where legislatures can call or control special sessions, executives do not appear to exploit intersession gaps in the same way.
- Executives facing legislatures without special-session powers increase unilateral actions after adjournment.
- Legislatures with special-session authority constrain this timing effect.
