### Context & Question
Legislative constraints and ideological conflict are key factors in separated systems. While executives may have incentives to bypass legislative preferences through unilateral actions like executive orders, US policymaking studies rarely show this happening.
### Findings: Governors' Strategy
This study explores how intersession breaks create opportunities for such behavior under divided government conditions without special session powers.
* Governors exploit legislative recesses following adjournment when the legislature lacks authority to reconvene early.
### Why It Matters
The research demonstrates that governors can strategically 'wait out' legislatures without special session powers, increasing unilateral activity during these periods. This finding highlights how legislatures with special session powers effectively constrain executive power even in divided governments.
| Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism was authored by Sharece Thrower and Alexander Bolton. It was published by Wiley in LSQ in 2022. |
