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(will be reviewed).

When multiple donors work in one place, corruption risks can rise

This paper asks whether aid fragmentation—the simultaneous operation of multiple development agencies in one setting—affects opportunities for corruption, and it provides the first microlevel empirical look at that question. Using project-level delivery data from Afghanistan, the authors examine how the number and coordination of donors relate to misappropriation and waste, and test a mechanism connecting the types of projects delivered to leakage.

Data and methods

The study leverages unique, microlevel data on project delivery in Afghanistan to conduct a first empirical analysis of aid fragmentation at the project scale. The authors frame the analysis around variation in how projects are implemented (single donor versus multiple donors) and report results consistent with a theoretical mechanism linking certain kinds of deliveries to loss.

Main findings

The paper reports two main patterns: projects delivered by a single donor are associated with lower corruption indicators, while projects delivered under conditions of aid fragmentation are associated with greater opportunities for corruption. The authors also present evidence consistent with a mechanism that ties infrastructure and physical goods to increased waste and leakage.

microlevel project-delivery data aid fragmentation evidence linking infrastructure to waste

  • Single-donor delivery is associated with reductions in corruption indicators.
  • Fragmented delivery—multiple agencies operating in the same setting—can facilitate corruption.
  • The observed mechanism connects infrastructure/physical-goods projects to waste and leakage.
Review of Economics and Statistics
Aid Fragmentation and Corruption was authored by Travers B. Child, Austin L. Wright and Yun Xiao. It was published in RESTAT in 2026. Find on Google Scholar10.1162/rest_a_01458
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