Electoral Systems

This paper asks whether the U.S. Electoral College (EC) produces unusually close, disputable presidential outcomes and reports a quantitative assessment using existing empirical election models. The authors apply novel combinations of empirical election models drawn from several sources to estimate the probability of “close” outcomes and to compare those probabilities under the EC versus plausible popular‑vote alternatives. Their central contribution is an explicit claim—based on these model applications—that the EC both generates and increases the likelihood of razor‑thin margins.

This paper asks whether and how electoral rules affect politicians’ incentives to pursue programmatic redistribution, exploiting France’s switch to—and later abandonment of—proportional representation in the interwar period. Using new data on deputies’ legislative initiatives and manifesto commitments, the authors compare the same politicians under different electoral rules to isolate how open-list PR versus single-member majoritarian rules related to programmatic effort in both parliamentary behavior and campaigning. The contribution is a within-politician comparison that tests whether open-list PR reduced programmatic redistribution relative to majoritarian rules, and situates the results in dialogue with both economic and political-science theories of electoral systems.

Understanding how electoral systems shape representation requires knowing whether voters follow system-specific strategic incentives or stick to simple heuristics. Single-member districts (SMDs) make semi-sincere voting — casting a ballot for the most-preferred party or candidate among the viable options — optimal and commonly observed. In multimember districts (MMDs), that same semi-sincere strategy becomes suboptimal. A formal model shows that, in MMDs, the optimal response is instead to vote to "kick out" the least-preferred party or candidate.

This article argues that classroom simulations of real-world electoral institutions are a powerful pedagogical tool for political science students.

A Chilean electoral reform introduced proportional representation and larger district magnitudes while voting remained voluntary and legislative and presidential elections continued to be held concurrently. The reform lengthened legislative ballots by offering more candidate options.

Japan's demanding electoral system makes voters rely on irrelevant cues like candidate name complexity. By analyzing election data, researchers find that simpler names get more votes when the ballot requires writing full names and reduces useful partisan cues. In other systems with less voter strain, name simplicity doesn't impact results.

Does benchmarking occur during elections? This article explores voter behavior regarding economic performance comparisons.

California and Washington adopted the "top-two" primary system to combat uncompetitive districts and elect moderates. This change allows same-party candidates to challenge each other before the general election.

Lawyers dominate many national parliaments. This study compares three countries with mixed electoral systems - Japan, South Korea and Germany.

At-large elections continue to dominate local government across the U.S., despite frequent legal challenges questioning their impact on minority political power. This study addresses ongoing debate by analyzing how transitioning from at-large to ward systems affected Latino representation, especially under specific conditions. Using a unique identification approach enabled by California's 2001 Voting Rights Act, researchers discovered significant positive gains occurred primarily in districts where Latinos represented a large voting share or experienced high residential segregation. Elsewhere, the study found no such effects.

High corruption levels reduce reliance on ideology in elections. This occurs due to voter difficulties identifying party positions or mistrust in their ability to deliver promised programs.

Ballots often list candidates in specific positions (e.g., top vs bottom). Does this position affect voter choice?

This paper explores how electoral systems shape government investment in social programs.

The study investigates new voting methods—downloadable ballots and early voting—to boost mail-in voting. Using a field experiment, researchers compared these innovations against traditional paper-based options.

This article examines why democracies sometimes renege on sovereign debt during crises.

This article investigates how different institutional features affect democratic satisfaction.

The impact of institutions on economic voting is clear in advanced democracies, but this Eurocentric view may obscure effects elsewhere. Analyzing 18 presidential elections across Latin America reveals a powerful institutional influence unique to the region's dynamic party systems and presidential regimes.