This article asks how the United States applies economic statecraft—positive "carrots" versus negative "sticks"—in response to Latin American countries’ engagement with China and offers a conditional mechanism for when each mode is more likely. The authors argue that U.S. policy in the region tends to emphasize economic engagement instead of coercion, especially with countries that are politically and economically aligned with Washington. They test this claim using a mixed-methods design that combines a focused case study of U.S.–Panama ties with a statistical analysis of how engagement with China relates to U.S. foreign assistance allocations in Latin America.
Mixed-methods design Case study: United States–Panama Statistical test of foreign assistance patterns
Data and methods
The study uses a mixed-methods approach described in the abstract. At the qualitative end, the authors conduct a case study of the United States–Panama relationship to trace the logic and sequencing of policy responses. At the quantitative end, they perform a statistical analysis that examines whether Latin American countries’ economic engagement with China is associated with changes in U.S. foreign assistance allocations. The abstract does not specify the statistical model, time frame, or variables beyond this general strategy.
Main findings
According to the abstract, the authors propose a mechanism linking country alignment to the choice between inducements and coercion, and they report that U.S. responses in the region tend to favor economic engagement over coercion when countries are politically and economically aligned with Washington. The abstract frames this as an argument tested with the Panama case and the regional assistance analysis; it does not provide specific effect sizes, statistical significance, or robustness checks in the summary.
- Qualitative tracing: in-depth case study of U.S.–Panama dynamics.
- Quantitative test: statistical analysis of U.S. foreign assistance allocation in relation to Chinese engagement.
