The impact of institutions on economic voting is clear in advanced democracies, but this Eurocentric view may obscure effects elsewhere. Analyzing 18 presidential elections across Latin America reveals a powerful institutional influence unique to the region's dynamic party systems and presidential regimes.
In these developing democracies, specific electoral institutions—like concurrence requirements or term limits—play a crucial role in voters' assessment of responsibility. The findings suggest political scientists rethink how 'clarity of responsibility' operates in presidential systems.
While party identification is significant elsewhere, Latin American research shows that institutional constraints on individuals in power are more central to economic voting outcomes here.
This innovative approach provides a nuanced framework for understanding how voters attribute economic performance differently depending on the political context.
| Economic Voting in Latin America: Rules and Responsibility was authored by Melody Valdini and Michael Lewis-Beck. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2018. |
