Can material reparations change how survivors of state violence engage with democracy? Elsa Voytas examines whether reparations payments do more than compensate material loss—asking if they can alter survivors' political behavior and their relationship to the state in a transitional context.
A Chilean electoral reform introduced proportional representation and larger district magnitudes while voting remained voluntary and legislative and presidential elections continued to be held concurrently. The reform lengthened legislative ballots by offering more candidate options.
Voters care about representatives' competence. Political parties face an incentive to signal this valence trait to win elections.
Countries commonly use economic sanctions to pressure foreign governments into policy changes. Elena V. McLean and Mitchell T. Radtke ask when sanctioning states will take into account the targeted leader's political prospects—and how that calculation interacts with whether the target is an ally or an adversary. Understanding this trade-off matters for explaining puzzling patterns in who gets sanctioned and for predicting the political consequences of coercive diplomacy.
Young, first-time voters are often the least registered and least represented. Alejandro Corvalan investigates whether a small procedural information cost — uncertainty about whether turning 18 before or after the registration deadline matters for eligibility — reduces registration among those who become eligible around the cutoff. Understanding this mechanism matters for debates about youth participation and low-cost policy fixes to boost registration.