This paper asks how political actors and bureaucratic managers jointly shape biased public-sector hiring. It models hiring as an allocation problem between politicians and managers who have different preferences over types of government positions and different abilities (leverage) to realize those preferences.
Religious institutions (RIs) are more than places of worship: they are everyday social spaces where people meet, exchange information, and build trust. David M. A. Murphy, Vesall Nourani, and David Lee ask whether attending the same RI actually causes people to form ties that facilitate advice and trust, rather than merely reflecting preexisting friendships.
This study investigates whether Kenyan politicians can exploit ethnic grievances through land-related appeals.
In Africa's ethnically contested elections, voter loyalty hinges on whether a co-ethnic candidate runs. This creates core voters (those with a co-ethnic leader) and swing voters (without).
This article examines common property institutions in Kenya, specifically among Maasai pastoralists.