This article asks how domestic factors affect US presidents’ decisions to lift sanctions and whether they choose different exit routes (for example, capitulation) depending on political pressure. Using a novel dataset of US sanctions from 1990–2018 combined with interviews and anecdotal practitioner evidence, the author links presidents’ political standing and congressional oversight to variation in the timing and manner of sanctions termination.
Key measurement: novel sanctions dataset; competing risks model Primary actors: US Presidency and US Congress
Data and methods
The study analyzes newly compiled data on all US sanctions imposed between 1990 and 2018 and models sanction termination using a competing risks framework. The abstract also reports interviews with US sanctions practitioners and anecdotal material that the author uses to complement statistical analysis.
Main findings
The author reports two qualified results from the statistical models and supporting interviews: presidents with stronger party control in Congress and higher public approval are reported as more likely to end sanctions, particularly via capitulation; and sanctions that include congressional oversight mechanisms are reported to last longer and are less likely to be lifted by the president before meeting their objectives. The abstract emphasizes that these findings highlight the role of domestic actors and suggests that lifting sanctions can be harder than imposing them.
- Presidents’ party power in Congress and public approval are associated with a higher likelihood of lifting sanctions (especially by capitulation).
- Congressional oversight provisions in sanction design are associated with longer durations and lower likelihood of presidential pre-fulfillment termination.
