
Many observers decry an "imperial presidency" in war-making, equating unilateral force with an unconstrained executive. This research reframes the war powers debate by centering the powerful incentives lawmakers have to avoid blame for military action.
🧭 A Theory of Shared Blame: "Loss Responsibility Costs"
A formal model of the war powers highlights "Loss Responsibility Costs." It argues that:
📊 Sentiment Evidence From Tens of Thousands of Congressional Speeches
Novel sentiment data drawn from tens of thousands of congressional floor speeches tests the theory. The analysis finds that when presidents act without formal authorization, they almost always do so in a context of lawmaker support characterized by:
✳️ Key Findings
💡 Why It Matters
This work challenges the simple narrative of an unconstrained executive in war powers. By revealing how blame avoidance shapes both presidential choices and congressional behavior, it reframes assessments of legislative power, accountability, and the politics of military intervention.

| War and Responsibility was authored by Patrick Hulme. It was published by Cambridge in APSR in 2026. |