This article re-examines the predictive model of state-level political instability developed by Goldstone et al. (2010). While their model accurately identified institutional factors, particularly factionalism in partial democracies, as key drivers during its original validation period (1995-2004), this accuracy has significantly decreased since then.

The decline is not solely attributable to the Arab Uprisings of recent years. Similar deterioration occurs when attempting to forecast nonviolent uprisings or armed conflict onset and continuation, as in studies by Chenoweth & Ulfelder (2017) and Hegre et al. (2013).

These findings suggest two critical conclusions:

* Drivers of Instability Are Not Constant: The factors causing political instability appear to have changed over time.

* Cautious Interpretation Needed: We must be careful not to interpret the performance of predictive models as direct evidence for or against theoretical explanations.