Longer Tenures Reduce Economic Voting: A Counterintuitive Look at Incumbency

Governments often gain responsibility for ongoing economic issues with time in office, potentially increasing voter accountability. However, if voters are Bayesian learners and accumulate information about government competence over tenure, this accumulated knowledge might crowd out the influence of current economic conditions on voting decisions.

This article examines these competing predictions using three datasets:

• Country-Level Data: Analysis across diverse elections reveals that support for experienced governments becomes less dependent on recent economic growth as their tenure extends.
• Individual-Level Surveys (60 surveys, 10 countries): Voter perceptions of the economy impact government support more significantly when incumbents are new or inexperienced.
• Danish Municipal Reform Data: A natural experiment assigning some voters to newly elected local incumbents shows stronger responsiveness to current municipal economic conditions among these voters.

Across all three studies, findings consistently demonstrate that tenure reduces reliance on economic voting. This suggests a shift in voter focus from short-term performance to accumulated competence or other established factors.