Introduction

This study investigates the allocation patterns within a long-running federal development fund in Pakistan, specifically examining whether spending adheres to rules-based principles despite political contexts.

Using regression discontinuity design (RDD), we analyze how allocations near constituency boundaries influenced election outcomes. We find compelling evidence that ruling parties consistently manipulated this ostensibly neutral resource:

• Fund distribution disproportionately favored co-partisans during key electoral periods

• Opposing candidates received significantly fewer resources, even from the weakest opposition segments

• Partisan bias appears to be the most significant factor driving allocation decisions

Implications

These findings challenge conventional wisdom about rules-based development funds in Pakistan:

• They demonstrate that neutral rules alone do not prevent political manipulation of resources

• This behavior fundamentally alters how such funds might typically impact constituency development

• The results highlight persistent concerns about distributive politics within Pakistani governance structures

While previous research has focused on either the absence of rules or their politicization, this study uniquely addresses whether formal neutrality prevents actual partisan advantage.