This paper reveals a counterintuitive finding: costly protests by low-resource groups can actually increase their visibility and legislative representation despite resource constraints. The core argument emerges from formal theory, suggesting that legislators are more responsive to protesters than previously thought.

Through analysis of roll-call vote data from the 102nd-104th US Congresses (1991-1997), we demonstrate that:

* Legislative behavior shifts significantly following protests by disadvantaged groups

* Compared to non-protesters or less-mobilized protesters, these groups receive disproportionate legislative support after mobilizing

* Protest activity serves as a signal for prioritizing low-resource interests in the political arena

This discovery highlights how political representation can sometimes favor marginalized populations when they successfully organize opposition. Using data on civil rights and minority issues protests from The New York Times database (1983-1996), we identify specific policy areas where this effect occurs, advancing understanding of legislative responsiveness to citizen mobilization.