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Governments Accumulate Reserves Post-Currency Crises: Explaining the Push for Policy Insurance

Foreign Exchange ReservesCurrency CrisisPolitical AccountabilityReserve SalesComparative PoliticsPSR&MDataverse
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📌 Context: Economic policy shifts after currency crises often vary, despite similar events occurring elsewhere.

🔍 Methods & Theory: Using theory of political accountability, this analysis examines how past crises shape future governments' decisions to build economic defenses. The argument is that government changes post-crisis provide crucial information about handling financial risks.

💡 Findings: Countries significantly increase foreign exchange reserves after a major currency crisis if it brought in a new political regime—especially when the change occurred during times where accountability wasn't expected. Importantly, governments prioritize this action only if they believe reserve sales are effective tools for prevention.

Significance: This research provides insight into why nations differ so much in their approaches to preventing future financial disasters following similar past crises.

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Insuring Against Past Perils: The Politics of Post-Currency Crisis Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation was authored by Liam F. McGrath. It was published by Cambridge in PSR&M in 2017.
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Political Science Research & Methods
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