
Introduction
New research reveals how democratic institutions influence property rights to attract foreign investment, especially in dynamic economies.
Methods & Findings
To test our hypothesis regarding the evolving role of democratic institutions in shaping the FDI-property rights relationship, we employed a sophisticated non-nested multilevel modeling strategy with random coefficients. This approach allowed us to capture country-level variations and contextual nuances effectively across different regions during the period from 1970 to 2009.
Our analysis demonstrates several key findings:
Why It Matters for Political Science
This research provides crucial insights into the complex interplay between institutional design (democracy), economic policy tools (property rights), and global investment patterns. The findings offer empirical support for theories suggesting that political institutions shape property systems to attract foreign capital, especially as economies evolve technologically.

| Property Rights Regimes, Technological Innovation, and Foreign Direct Investment was authored by Mark Nieman and Cameron G. Thies. It was published by Cambridge in PSR&M in 2019. |