New data from eight parliamentary democracies over four decades reveals how electoral commitments influence welfare policy implementation in multiparty cabinets.

The Core Idea: Audience Costs Theory

This research proposes 'audience costs' theory - strong platform commitments enhance parties' negotiating positions but only under certain conditions. When a party controls the social affairs portfolio, its ability to deliver on election promises depends critically on whether it had previously committed to that policy.

What We Found: A Surprising Pattern

Our analysis shows:

• Social democrats controlling welfare portfolios without strong platform commitments don't significantly impact welfare generosity

• The relationship changes dramatically when parties make explicit electoral pledges about social welfare

• These findings hold even in complex multi-party systems not dominated by three major parties

This nuanced understanding reveals how political accountability works through portfolio control and prior policy commitments.

How This Matters: Political Science Implications

Our results demonstrate:

• A clearer mechanism for coalition bargaining success

• Why electoral promises matter differently depending on context

• New insights into the conditions under which parties can effectively translate platforms into policy