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Why Politicians Dismiss Tax Polls: Voters Seem Uninformed and Anti‑Tax
Insights from the Field
representation
public opinion
taxation
Germany
focus groups
European Politics
CPS
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1 Datasets
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Dataverse
The Role of Preference Formation and Perception in Unequal Representation. Combined Evidence from Elite Interviews and Focus Groups in Germany was authored by Florian Fastenrath and Paul Marx. It was published by Sage in CPS in 2025.

🔎 How Evidence Was Collected

A two-stage research design examines politicians’ broader assumptions about public preferences on redistributive tax policy in Germany. The study moves beyond numerical accuracy of poll estimates to explore beliefs about preference crystallization, salience, malleability, and measurability in surveys.

  • Stage 1: Interviews with parliamentarians probed how elected officials interpret public opinion and whether they view poll support as politically meaningful.
  • Stage 2: Twelve focus groups with high- and low-educated citizens tested the assumptions derived from the interviews by observing actual conversations about taxing the rich.

📊 What the Evidence Shows

  • Politicians commonly perceive voters as uninformed, disinterested, and vulnerable to anti-tax framing by business actors.
  • Expressed support in polls for taxing the rich is frequently dismissed by politicians as superficial and unlikely to affect voting behavior.
  • Focus-group discussions largely confirmed the politicians’ assumptions: participants showed indifference toward tax issues and displayed anti-tax attitudes when debating specifics.
  • No clear education gap in tax preferences was detected across the twelve focus groups.
  • Support for taxing the rich that appears in survey responses often dissipates during conversational deliberation, mirroring politicians’ experiences.

🧠 Why It Matters

These findings suggest unequal representation can stem not only from misestimation of preference distributions but from policymakers’ broader beliefs about how stable, salient, and measurable public preferences are. If elected officials treat poll support as shallow or nonbinding, public preferences—especially on redistribution—may be discounted in policy decisions even when surveys indicate majority support.

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Comparative Political Studies
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