
📊 Data Used: Disciplinary Investigations in Two Communist Parties
A new dataset of disciplinary investigations within the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Parties is used to compare how authoritarian leaders manage the trade-off between deterring rent-seeking and keeping factional allies loyal. The analysis exploits variation across provinces and factional connections to traced patterns of protection and punishment.
🔎 The Mechanism Tested: Factional Malleability Shapes Protection Choices
Factional malleability—how much a regime’s factions are built on flexible personal ties—conditions which protection strategy the leader chooses. Two contrasting methods are evaluated:
Under rigid factions, allies face a non-credible defection threat; leaders therefore prefer ex post protection, which is more valuable to the leader than to his subordinates, and show this by giving delayed, lenient punishments to investigated officials in factionally connected provinces. Under malleable factions, allies can credibly defect, so leaders instead offer ex ante protection by removing the same officials from investigation.
✅ Key Findings and Why It Matters
These results explain how regimes with similar formal institutions can produce divergent anti-corruption outcomes by varying the form of political protection based on factional structure.

| The Factional Logic of Political Protection in Authoritarian Regimes was authored by Duy Trinh. It was published by Sage in CPS in 2025. |
