📰 What This Study Shows

This article investigates how clientelism affects intra-party democracy, focusing on parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It argues that when parties pursue clientelism, internal selection processes become less competitive, leaders dominate party bodies, and rank-and-file members are limited in their influence over organizational and policy matters.

📊 Key Empirical Findings

Longitudinal analyses corroborate a negative relationship between clientelism and intra-party democracy for a sample of CEE parties and for a larger sample of parties outside the region. Main empirical takeaways include:

• Less competitive selection processes for candidates and leaders
• Greater leader domination over party bodies
• Reduced influence of rank-and-file members on organizational and policy decisions
• Both single-shot and relational clientelism are negatively associated with intra-party democracy, with relational clientelism exerting the stronger effect

🔎 How the Evidence Was Gathered and Interpreted

• Statistical, longitudinal analyses of parties in CEE and a broader cross-regional sample were used to test the hypothesized relationships
• The analysis distinguishes between single-shot clientelism and relational clientelism to assess differential impacts
• Statistical results are complemented by qualitative accounts that trace how clientelism and weak intra-party democracy connect to parties' origins, ideological orientation, and broader organizational strategies

💡 Why It Matters

Findings show that clientelism does more than exploit party networks: it reshapes party organization by concentrating power in leaders and hollowing out internal democracy. This has implications for party accountability, policy responsiveness, and the prospects for democratizing party structures in CEE and beyond.