🔍 Why This Question Matters

Mayors across Latin America face strong citizen demands for security even when they have limited or no formal control over police. With 43 of the world’s 50 most violent cities in the region, some mayors have expanded municipal roles in policing while others have deliberately constrained involvement in this electorally risky area. The study asks what explains this variation in mayors’ strategic linkages to police forces they do not formally control.

🧭 How São Paulo, Colombia, and Mexico City Were Compared

The analysis uses within-case and cross-case comparisons of policing arrangements in São Paulo, Colombia, and Mexico City. These comparisons trace how institutional rules, electoral pressures, and on-the-ground policing behaviors interact to shape mayoral decisions about engagement with security provision.

📈 Key Findings

• Electoral incentives for responsiveness: mayors whose electoral fortunes hinge on showing responsiveness to crime are more likely to expand municipal policing linkages.
• Constitutional rules that impose responsibility: legal and institutional frameworks that assign responsibility for security push mayors toward greater involvement even when formal control is limited.
• Risks of police shirking: concerns that police will fail to implement or will circumvent municipal initiatives lead some mayors to limit their engagement with policing.
• Together, these factors explain why some mayors actively link municipal government to policing while others refrain despite similar external pressure.

🌎 Why It Matters

These findings place policing at the center of understanding urban governance and democratic responsiveness. They show that variations in mayoral behavior reflect a mix of electoral strategy, constitutional constraint, and operational risk — implications that inform both scholarship on local democracy and practical debates about municipal roles in public security.