🔎 Puzzle and Argument

Existing literature treats popular support for liberal democratic values as a key check on illiberal actors, yet recent work shows declared democratic support can coexist with tolerance for backsliding. The argument advanced here is that social norms create incentives to publicly oppose illiberal actors without sincerely holding those views. These actors are labeled "staged democrats": people who cosmetically endorse democratic norms but do not genuinely punish illiberal politics. Because staged democrats signal rather than sincerely oppose illiberalism, they are not a stable safeguard—information shocks can reveal their insincerity and change political outcomes.

🧭 What 'Staged Democrats' Means in Practice

• Social norms encourage declarations of anti-illiberal sentiment even when private preferences differ.
• Public expressions of democratic commitment can therefore be performative rather than substantive.
• When true preferences become visible, staged democrats no longer constrain illiberal actors.

📊 How Switzerland and Referendums Reveal True Preferences

• Switzerland's frequent referendums provide sharp information about citizens' sincere policy positions.
• The empirical strategy links three data sources:
• referendum results (as revelation of sincere voter preferences),
• public opinion surveys, and
• party position data.
• These data allow testing whether information shocks about popular support alter party behavior.

📈 Key Findings

• When referendums reveal that positions advocated by far-right parties are more popular than expected, those parties respond by adopting more exclusionary positions.
• Declared democratic attitudes only prevent illiberal policy when those attitudes are sincerely held; performative opposition does not constrain parties.
• Staged democrats can therefore enable short-term norm compliance while leaving politics vulnerable to shifts once preferences are revealed.

⚖️ Why It Matters

This study reconciles two puzzles in the literature—widespread stated support for democracy and continued tolerance of backsliding—by showing how social signaling can mask true preferences. The results highlight the importance of credible information about citizen preferences: democratic norms matter only when they reflect sincere commitments, and institutional designs that reveal sincere preferences can change party incentives and the supply of exclusionary ideology.