🔎 What Was Studied

This study asks whether affluence shapes bureaucratic responsiveness in an authoritarian setting without competitive elections. The focus is on how wealth at the neighborhood level affects how local governments handle municipal service problems in downtown Shanghai.

🧾 How the Evidence Was Collected

• Matched administrative municipal service records to apartment complex-level housing prices in downtown Shanghai to measure responsiveness and neighborhood affluence.
• Semi-structured interviews with street-level bureaucrats to uncover decision-making motivations.
• A formal theoretical model that links bureaucratic incentives to observed behavior.

📌 Key Findings

• Faster Response Times: Local governments resolve reported issues more quickly for residents in wealthier areas, indicating a clear priority bias in timeliness.
• Similar Resolution Quality: Despite slower response times in poorer neighborhoods, residents there receive positive resolutions at rates comparable to those in richer neighborhoods.
• Explaining the Mix: Interviews and the formal model attribute these mixed outcomes to dual mandates facing street-level bureaucrats:
• Efficiency pressure that encourages quicker handling of some complaints (favoring affluent areas);
• Social stability concerns that push for satisfactory resolutions across neighborhoods, preventing poorer areas from receiving systematically worse outcomes.

💡 Why It Matters

Findings show that unequal responsiveness can exist in authoritarian contexts even without electoral competition, but that different aspects of responsiveness (speed versus outcome) may move in opposite directions. The results illuminate how bureaucratic incentives—efficiency and stability—shape service delivery, with implications for understanding governance, accountability, and policy targeting in authoritarian cities.