What explains why some Amazon municipalities lose more forest than others? This study shows that local electoral competition causally increases deforestation — especially where private commercial actors stand to profit from forest clearing — and it identifies a specific political strategy behind that outcome.

📡 Satellite Imagery and a Shift-Share Instrumental Design

• Satellite imagery maps deforestation across municipalities in the Brazilian Amazon.
• A novel shift‑share instrumental variable design isolates the causal effect of local electoral competition on forest loss.

🧾 Key Findings

• Electoral competition causally increases deforestation at the municipal level.
• The effect is strongest where private commercial interests that engage in clearing are present.
• Competition creates incentives for mayors to pursue strategic non-enforcement of environmental rules to placate those interests.
• Qualitative interviews and administrative records on appointments document the mechanism: mayors respond by rapidly appointing new personnel to sidestep existing staff who resist weakening enforcement.

⚙️ Bureaucratic Packing: A Strategic Bypass of Enforcement

• "Bureaucratic packing" is identified as a surge in new appointments intended to bypass entrenched bureaucrats and reduce regulatory capacity.
• Administrative appointment data show spikes in hiring tied to political turnover and competitive races.
• Interview evidence indicates the tactic is used instrumentally to undermine enforcement, not merely to reward patrons.

📌 Why It Matters

• Findings reframe the role of subnational politics in environmental outcomes: appointments can be wielded to weaken regulation and enable resource extraction.
• Results challenge standard accounts that treat appointments mainly as patronage rewards and highlight a politically driven mechanism that degrades bureaucratic capacity and drives deforestation.