
🔒 Privacy Problem Exposed
De-identification—removing names and direct identifiers—has long been the standard way to share survey data. Recent work shows these procedures do not stop intentional re-identification attacks, creating a real risk for large survey programs in academia, government, and industry. This risk is especially acute in political science because respondents’ political beliefs are among the most sensitive information they provide.
🔎 How Re-identification Was Tested
A practical demonstration confirms the threat: individuals were re-identified from a de-identified survey about a controversial referendum declaring life beginning at conception. Key points about the demonstration:
🛡️ A Practical Fix Built on Differential Privacy
A set of new data-sharing procedures, grounded in the formal notion of differential privacy, is proposed to address the problem. These procedures provide:
⚖️ Trade-offs and Implications
The primary cost of deploying differential privacy for survey data is larger standard errors in estimates derived from the privatized data. However, this cost has a clear remedy: larger sample sizes reduce the privacy-induced loss of precision. Implications include:
💡 Why It Matters
Adopting differential privacy preserves respondent confidentiality with provable guarantees while keeping survey data usable for research. Without it, traditional de-identification leaves respondents vulnerable to re-identification—undermining trust in survey research and threatening the viability of studies that collect highly sensitive political information.

| Differentially Private Survey Research was authored by Georgina Evans, Gary King, Adam D. Smith and Abhradeep Thakurta. It was published by Wiley in AJPS in 2025. |
