📌 What this study asks

It is long assumed that citizens support the welfare state because it insures against future income loss, but isolating future-oriented material interest from normative and political predispositions has been difficult. This study tests whether economic uncertainty drives citizens to take up government-funded social insurance, a critical case for material self-interest to be at stake.

📊 Data and quasi-experiment: Population administrative panel records from Denmark plus survey linkage

• Uses population-wide administrative panel data from Denmark to observe real take-up of social insurance.
• Leverages as-if random variation in exposure to signals of unemployment risk as a quasi-experimental source of identification.
• Links administrative records to individual-level survey data to measure subjective responses (job insecurity) to those exposure signals.

🔍 Key findings

• Exposure to signals of unemployment risk increases the probability of buying supplementary unemployment insurance coverage.
• The administrative–survey linkage shows that exposure also increases feelings of job insecurity, consistent with economic worries driving behavior.
• Together, the evidence indicates that material self-interest—responding to perceived future income risk—shapes citizens’ welfare-state behavior.

💡 Why it matters

These results demonstrate a clear behavioral channel through which economic uncertainty affects welfare-state choices. The findings offer actionable insight for policymakers designing social insurance: perceived risk and material incentives matter for take-up of coverage and should be considered when crafting communication, eligibility, and subsidy policies.