This study investigates the demand side of vote buying by asking when voters participate in, tolerate, or punish targeted material exchanges for votes. The central question is whether voters view vote buying as substituting for local public goods provision in office or as a signal that candidates will deliver such goods.

📊 How public opinion was measured

• A nationwide survey of Nepali voters provided the empirical foundation.
• Multiple survey experiments were embedded in that survey to probe perceptions about vote buying and local public goods.

🧪 What the experiments show

• Experimental evidence indicates Nepali voters tend to perceive vote buying and local public goods provision as substitutes rather than complements.
• Voters who hold the substitute view are more likely to express a preference for candidates who do not engage in vote buying, suggesting they prioritize future public goods provision.
• The preference for non–vote-buying candidates is observationally associated with the substitute belief; this latter result is not causally identified by the experimental design.

🔑 Why it matters

• Perceiving vote buying as a substitute for public goods implies that clientelistic strategies may backfire where voters expect tradeoffs between private inducements and collective investments.
• These findings bear on theories of accountability, clientelism, and electoral strategy by highlighting a demand-side mechanism that can shape candidate behavior and voter choice.