🔎 What Was Compared

Comparison focuses on Peruvian municipalities where the previous incumbent was ousted through a recall referendum versus municipalities where a recall referendum failed by a small margin. The goal is to estimate how political accountability mechanisms affect who runs for office when those mechanisms are vulnerable to political capture.

📊 How the Comparison Identifies Effects

• Examines candidate pools in municipalities that experienced a successful recall against those where the recall narrowly failed.
• Uses the close-margin recall outcomes to isolate the effect of having a recalled incumbent in the prior term on subsequent candidate selection.

🧾 Key Findings

• Having a recalled incumbent in the previous term causes negative selection of candidates on observable qualifications: lower levels of education and less prior experience.
• Candidate pools in these municipalities are also less representative of indigenous groups.
• These negative effects are concentrated in localities where the accountability institution appears likely to be used for political purposes, consistent with political capture undermining the intended benefits of recall tools.

⚖️ Why It Matters

When accountability instruments are captured for partisan or strategic ends, they can produce unintended consequences for candidate quality and descriptive representation. Policies that expand or rely on recall mechanisms should account for the risk of capture if the objective is to improve the caliber and inclusiveness of political entrants.