This study examines how voters navigate electoral trade-offs between individual benefits and group coordination for collective goods.

What's the Core Question?

How do voters balance personal gain against coordinating support among social groups in elections?

We designed a laboratory experiment where we induced participants' sense of belonging to specific groups. This allowed us to observe their voting behavior under controlled conditions when faced with strategic choices.

Our findings reveal two distinct dynamics:

* Low Heterogeneity Groups: These groups tend to coordinate effectively, choosing candidates whose policies best serve the collective interest even if it means sacrificing some individual benefits for a majority of members. They successfully secure club goods from a popular candidate.

* More Diverse Groups: Coordination on that ideal candidate fails more often in these settings. While they still manage to obtain club goods, it typically comes through supporting candidates whose overall policy package is individually less appealing or costly.

Why This Matters:

The results highlight the crucial role of strategic considerations in shaping politically relevant group-based coalitions and voting patterns. It demonstrates how group cohesion (or lack thereof) directly impacts collective decision-making at the ballot box.