Local-level climate action depends on institutional design, but which arrangements win elite support in Latin America? This study uses a large-scale choice experiment to map elite preferences over thousands of possible local climate governance arrangements.

🔎 How the Study Tested Institutional Designs

• A conjoint experiment presented elite respondents with institutional designs drawn from a pool of 5,500 possible local climate governance arrangements.
• Respondents were elite members from 10 Latin American countries who evaluated alternative policy designs and conflict-resolution mechanisms.

📊 Key Results

• Strong preference for international organizations to formulate climate policies.
• Clear support for imposing increasing fines on violators as an enforcement tool.
• Preference for renewing agreements every five years rather than longer or indefinite terms.
• Support for both international institutions and local courts to mediate conflicts over climate rules.
• Distrust of non-governmental organizations and rejection of informal norms as legitimate means of conflict resolution.

⚠️ Why This Matters For Policy Design

• These elite preferences point to potential obstacles when crafting local mitigation policies that rely on NGOs or informal governance.
• Findings suggest integrating international bodies and formal local judicial mechanisms could increase elite buy-in for local climate rules.
• The results provide actionable insight for aligning local implementation strategies with elite expectations across multiple Latin American contexts.