🔎 What Was Studied
Advocates of wartime international criminal tribunals (ICTs) hope these courts can deter combatant atrocities against civilians. More than twenty-five years after the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the question of whether and when wartime ICTs deter such violence remains contested.
đź“š The Theory Guiding the Argument
Insights from criminology, research on civil conflict, and studies of international legal compliance point to a conditional deterrent effect. Deterrence is most likely when all three of the following conditions are present:
- Sufficient prosecutorial support for ICT officials;
- Combatant groups rely on support from liberal constituencies; and
- Combatant groups have centralized organizational structures.
đź› How the Claim Was Tested
Evidence comes from detailed case studies of the ICTY's impact on fourteen combatant groups involved in the Yugoslav conflicts, paired with hundreds of field interviews with war veterans and other firsthand participants and witnesses.
🔑 Key Findings
- The ICTY’s ability to deter atrocities is conditional: notable deterrent effects appear only when all three theoretical conditions are met.
- Where prosecutors lacked political or material support, constituencies were not liberal, or groups were decentralized, the tribunal’s deterrent reach was limited or absent.
- The case studies and interviews confirm the theoretical prediction and clarify the mechanisms linking tribunals to combatant behavior.
🌍 Why It Matters
These results illuminate when contemporary wartime ICTs—including the International Criminal Court—are likely to succeed in reducing atrocities against civilians, offering concrete guidance for policymakers, tribunal advocates, and scholars about the practical limits and prerequisites of legal deterrence.
