🔎 What This Study Asks and Finds

This article challenges the dominant view that material resources (money and military power) are the main route to successful international mediation of civil wars. It argues that legitimacy — the social conviction that a mediator is the appropriate and desirable actor — also shapes mediation outcomes. By comparing African and non‑African third parties, the study finds that African mediators, despite typically lower material capacity, are more likely to secure negotiated settlements that endure.

📊 Mapping Every African Mediation Effort, 1960–2017

• Built from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and a newly compiled dataset covering every mediation effort in Africa between 1960 and 2017.
• Systematic, quantitative comparison of outcomes produced by African third parties versus non‑African third parties.
• Outcome measures include whether a negotiated settlement was reached and the durability of those settlements.

🔑 Key Findings

• African third parties are significantly more likely than non‑African ones to conclude negotiated settlements in African civil wars.
• Settlements brokered by African mediators are more likely to be durable.
• The effectiveness of African mediators is strongest when conflict parties demonstrate a high commitment to the “African solutions” norm — a widespread belief within the African society of states that African mediation is preferable.
• These results hold even though African mediators often lack the economic and military resources emphasized by rationalist‑materialist accounts.

⭐ Why This Matters

• Demonstrates that social sources of authority (legitimacy) can substitute for, or complement, material leverage in mediation.
• Supplements the existing literature that privileges material power by putting legitimacy at the center of explanation for mediation success.
• Has practical implications for policymakers and mediators: local or regional actors with strong legitimacy may be uniquely positioned to secure and sustain peace, even when lacking material coercive capacity.