This study investigates how property taxation policies influence electoral incentives and voting behavior. By analyzing municipal-level data from Brazilian states between 2005-2018, we demonstrate that changes to local tax structures significantly impact political competition.

Data & Methods:

We utilize detailed voter registration records alongside municipal financial datasets collected over a decade (2005–2018).

* Our primary data source tracks property tax reforms across Brazilian municipalities

* We analyze patterns in voter turnout and candidate spending as response variables

Key Findings:

• Increases in residential property taxes lead to heightened political competition in affected areas

• Wealthier residents respond by increasing campaign contributions during periods of tax hikes

• The findings suggest that fiscal policy design creates tangible incentives for electoral politics at the local level

Why It Matters:

These results provide crucial insights into how seemingly technical tax policies can become politicized. They highlight a previously overlooked mechanism through which property rights frameworks influence democratic processes in developing nations.