Why Brazilian Presidents Claim Congress's Bills as Their Own

🔎 What Was Studied

Brazilian presidents, despite possessing several power resources, often craft legislative proposals by adopting bills already moving through Congress — a phenomenon described as "Appropriation of the legislative agenda." This study investigates when and how appropriation occurs and what it does to presidential power.

🧭 How the Study Was Done

A typology of appropriation strategies is developed and a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is applied to identify the combinations of conditions that produce appropriation.

📌 Key Findings

• Appropriation expands the president's formal support base by enabling control over the legislative agenda of both allied and opposition parties.
• By claiming "paternity" of policies already in motion in Congress, the president and the president's party secure public association with potential social benefits.
• Appropriation is used both to pursue promising policy agendas and to maintain political dominance.
• The phenomenon shows that Brazilian presidents must operate beyond traditional coalition presidentialism to secure agenda control and political credit.

💡 Why It Matters

Appropriation reframes executive-legislative dynamics in Brazil: agenda control and symbolic ownership of policies become central tools for expanding support and shaping policy outcomes, with implications for studies of presidential power, accountability, and party politics.