This article explains how judicial review shapes political relations between national and subnational governments in Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. The analysis centers on two core questions: how supreme courts become pivotal arbiters of vertical intergovernmental disputes, and how national and subnational politicians deploy judicial review to advance their own interests.

📌 What Was Compared

The study contrasts judicial review processes across three systems: federal Brazil, quasi‑federal Spain, and unitary Colombia. Comparison focuses on disputes that originate at the subnational level and on how courts intervene in those disputes.

🔎 How the Comparison Was Conducted

• Accounts for differences in territorial organization and systems of government across the three cases.
• Assesses patterns of judicial review that begin with subnational actors and then escalate to the supreme or constitutional courts.
• Evaluates both institutional pathways (how courts become focal venues) and strategic behavior (how politicians use courts to pursue interests).

🔑 Key Findings

• Supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for settling vertical intergovernmental disputes in all three country cases.
• National and subnational politicians make strategic use of judicial review to enhance their own interests, using courts as venues to resolve or shift political contests.
• The way courts affect interactions between national and subnational politicians varies by country: the territorial organization and system of government shape distinct patterns of the judicialization of territorial politics.

⚖️ Why It Matters

The findings show that courts are not merely legal referees but active political actors in territorial disputes. Understanding these different patterns of judicialization is essential for explaining how judicial institutions influence center–region relations and for anticipating how political actors will use judicial channels in diverse constitutional settings.