Why Brazilian Presidents Get Their Bills Passed — Popularity Isn't Helping

🔎 What was examined

This article investigates why Brazilian presidents vary in their ability to pass legislation across administrations and within individual terms. The analysis focuses on the Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff governments and tests how institutional prerogatives, exclusive policy domains, and political-context factors affect presidential legislative success.

🔍 How the issue was analyzed

Empirical analysis of legislative outcomes from the Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff administrations evaluates the influence of institutional tools and contextual variables on presidents' bill passage rates. The study specifically contrasts the effects of prerogatives and exclusive policy matters with political-context factors such as timing relative to elections, coalition size, presidential skill, and popularity.

📌 Key findings

• Prerogatives and exclusive policy matters have a positive effect on presidential success (notably provisional measures and administrative and budgetary matters).
• Legislative success is higher during the honeymoon period—i.e., when the government is further from an electoral period.
• Larger governing coalitions are associated with significant positive increases in legislative success.
• Presidential skill does not show a statistically significant impact on success.
• Presidential popularity has a negative effect on legislative success and therefore does not contribute positively to presidents' ability to pass their bills.

⚖️ Why it matters

The results show that institutional advantages and coalition-building drive presidential lawmaking in Brazil more than individual leaders' skill or public approval. This points to the central role of formal prerogatives and political context in shaping executive legislative power in multiparty presidential systems.