Why Better Schools Hurt Incumbents in Brazil

📌 Research Question and Context

Does higher-quality public service lead voters to reward politicians? This question is investigated using signals of municipal school quality in Brazil, a setting particularly favorable to electoral accountability.

📊 Evidence From Close Races and a Field Intervention

Two rigorous empirical approaches — a regression discontinuity design and a field experiment — produce strikingly consistent results. Contrary to standard expectations, signals of higher municipal school quality reduce electoral support for the local incumbent.

📋 Who Reacts Positively to School Quality

• The anticipated positive electoral effect appears for the group most directly affected: parents with children enrolled in municipal schools.

🧪 What Voters Seem to Be Doing (Survey Evidence)

An online survey experiment helps explain the paradox. Voters who do not prioritize education tend to interpret improved school quality as a signal of municipal policy priorities and infer trade-offs with other public services.

• Voters use school quality as more than a competence cue; it is also a cue about policy priorities.

• Non-salient policy gains can reduce incumbent support when voters perceive competing needs.

🔍 Why This Matters

These findings show that electoral accountability operates through both competence and representation: citizens punish or reward incumbents not only for ability to deliver services but also for whether those services reflect voters’ own priorities. This nuance complicates the straightforward logic behind many accountability interventions aimed at improving service quality.