📝 What the study asks and why it matters

This research note examines incentives for former rebel combatants to remobilize in ongoing civil war, a topic that has received limited attention. The goal is to inform scholarship on when and why ex-fighters might go back to violence, using micro-level evidence from volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war.

📍 Interviews with ex-combatants in Gaziantep (late 2014–early 2015)

• 196 volunteer ex-fighters were surveyed.
• Respondents had served with a variety of rebel formations: brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army, moderate Islamist groups, and jihadist groups.
• Interviews took place in Gaziantep, Turkey, a frequent destination for combatants leaving the battlefield in rebel-held northern Syria.

🔎 What the surveys measured

• Motivations to remobilize for violence.
• Ideological commitments (e.g., desire to defeat the Assad regime, support for establishing an Islamic state).
• Perceptions of rebel group organization, discipline, and strategy.

📈 Key findings

• Ex-fighters with strong ideological commitments—either to defeating the Assad regime or to establishing an Islamic state—are most likely to express a desire to return to combat.
• Despite high motivation among some fighters, many are kept from remobilizing by rebel group organizational deficiencies and by group strategies that limit opportunities to fight.

⚠️ Why this matters for conflict dynamics

These results show that motivated fighters can be held in check by weak or disorganized rebel structures, but also that rapid remobilization is possible when disciplined, well-organized groups appear. The rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS) provides an illustrative example of how organizational capacity can translate motivated ex-combatants into renewed violence.